Transcript

How is the shift in foreign policy under Donald Trump reshaping US alliances, and what does this mean for global security?

To what extent is the US still a force for global stability?

Could the new direction in US foreign policy under Donald Trump succeed in pulling Russia away from its partnership with China?

In this episode, Beth Sanner joins Rory Medcalf to explore the Trump administration's approach to global issues – particularly in Europe and the Indo-Pacific, the evolving dynamics of US alliances, and the broader threat environment.

(This transcript is AI-generated and may contain inaccuracies.)

Beth Sanner

Honestly, it's not good for the American economy.. our steel industry is not able to fill these gaps. How can we build ships without importing steel.

National Security Podcast

You’re listening to the National Security Podcast. The show that brings you expert analysis, insights and opinion on the national security challenges facing Australia and the Indo-pacific Produced by the ANU National Security College.

Rory Medcalf

Welcome to the National Security Podcast. I'm Rory Medcalf, Head of the National Security College at the Australian National University. We're recording this podcast from the traditional lands of the Ngunnawal and Ngambri people and pay respects to their elders past, present and to all the connection to these lands here in Canberra.

Our episode today is part of a series looking at the strategic shocks emerging particularly from the second Trump administration. And it's really appropriate that we're joined today by Beth Sanner. Beth is a good friend of the National Security College, a distinguished advisor with the college, but also holds some key positions in the United States today in the think tank and business community looking at Security and Strategy. She's Director of Geopolitics and Strategy at International Capital Strategies. She holds a Senior Fellow position with the Intelligence Program at Harvard University's Belfast Center. Other roles as well. Perhaps more importantly for our listeners, Beth was Intelligence Briefer to President Donald Trump during the first Trump administration. Beth, welcome back to the National Security Podcast.

Beth Sanner

Thank you so much Rory, I'm really happy to be here even though I'd prefer to be in camera. This is the next best thing.

Rory Medcalf

We look forward to seeing you back in Australia. You made a real impact when you joined us last year for our National Security Conference, Securing our Future. But let's look at events in and really the repercussions from the Trump administration in the United States, the second Trump administration. We're recording this conversation in early March 2025.

Things are moving very fast. only weeks into the administration. Already the strategic shocks and uncertainties are rolling out from Europe to the Middle East and even to the Indo-Pacific. So I want to jump right in and I guess ask you to explain to our listeners what is going on. Is there a strategy in the Trump administration's approach, whether it's to Ukraine, to the treatment of allies? to the global system.

Beth Sanner

Well, I think, thank you Rory, I think that there is a theory of action and that is the America first concept, right? That as Marco Rubio said, all US foreign policy should be about the security, prosperity and safety of Americans, right? So that concept is kind of thrown around, but I think that all of their actions, they do bucket under that one rubric.

And I feel that, you know, from my experience, that President Trump can have very good relations with individual leaders, but still has that North Star of even though we might be friends, if you're doing something that doesn't work in terms of fairness or security, prosperity for Americans, then we're going to talk about that and do things. And that is, I think, what we're seeing.

But I would say that more broadly, we are seeing, we are in like week six, something like that. And yes, it feels like a year with the shock and awe. But the tactics certainly have gotten ahead of any real grand strategy when you take it below that level of, you know, what is it that we believe in? But a strategy of what we're trying to achieve is not yet clear.

And in many ways, you get that. They haven't even gotten all of their people in place. But because there's so much movement on the tactical front, I think that it's becoming a serious problem because allies and friends and partners and Americans, we don't really know what's going on. We don't know why. Yeah.

Rory Medcalf

So, look, that's not reassuring to allies and partners. think, as I said, recording early March, many of us are looking aghast, frankly, at what's happening in the transatlantic relationship, the transatlantic crisis. Some are talking even of the death of NATO, obviously, extreme risk to Ukraine and to the future of security in Europe. Do you...

since that there's at least in the short term a strategic logic to the way the administration is treating Ukraine and Europe? And did they anticipate the way that Europe is responding?

Beth Sanner

Don't think that they anticipated how Europe is responding, but I also don't think that they particularly care. I don't think that's what their purpose is. think that President Trump's purpose is, number one, to end the war. And then for me, the second part of that is unclear. Is the purpose to end the war in a just and fair way that's sustainable. And that's what many people around him have said. So if that's true, that's great. Or what sometimes feels like is Ukraine actually a speed bump on the way to improve U.S.-Russian relations. And so we don't know because we don't really understand the strategy here of which ones of these things is actually the preeminent thing as he works toward negotiations. I truly believe he wants to end the war. And I do believe that he wants to end the war in a way that's sustainable because he wouldn't want to be responsible for it falling apart. That's not a good look. But I'm not sure that there is a grasping of how you go about this and the damage that can be done and is being done by the process in and of itself. And so, you know, and I think that these things aren't necessarily happening intentionally, but the lack of effort and care being applied to preserving the structures and the relationships that are necessary for it to be sustained is a problem.

Rory Medcalf

Of course, at another level, or from another angle, I should say, it's fascinating and I think quite heartening to see the way that leaders in Europe are suddenly changing their priorities and their narrative. And let's hope, I think, their actions. mean, the idea of Germany becoming, hopefully with some speed, a really substantial military power. The talk that we're hearing now from especially the United Kingdom, but also France, about stepping up other European partners as well. And the recognition in Europe that they really must and can deliver security according to the enormous potential of the European, the size of the European economy, the size of the European population, know, right and defence potential. From the point of view of coalitions of democracies around the world, that is surely a very good thing. Now it's dreadful that this crisis is what has brought it on and it's not going to be a Europe that frankly has a lot of trust in the alliance with the United States for quite some time to come. But I mean, how is that being perceived, if not within the administrations, then within the strategic community in the United States?

Beth Sanner

Well, I think I would say for the administration that this is a win. That they had to, I think from their view, if they didn't shake things up and scare the Europeans this much, they never would stand up. And I...

Rory Medcalf

But is the profound lack of trust a win?

Beth Sanner

No, that's a lose. I guess from my personal perspective, the Europeans have always disappointed in not following through enough. Not always, that's maybe not fair. I mean, in that they certainly stepped up with Ukraine. And the numbers that President Trump throws around, are totally incorrect, right? That Europe actually is spending more in support of Ukraine. That is correct. But the United States is putting way, way more in terms of the military. But I would say also just stepping back a little bit further, part of the reason that Europe, it doesn't have the capacity in its defence industrial base is by design on America's part. We've been always schizophrenic about this. And we remain schizophrenic about this. I just saw a post from someone in the administration criticizing von der Leyen, standing up and saying, we're going to put a lot more into defence. We're going to put together this fund where we can do joint procurement and loans and help the Ukrainians buy arms. I look at that and I say, wow, that's awesome. The response was, “Oh look at them. They're rearming for World War III and they're warmongers.” And I just, again, isn't that kind of schizophrenic? We want Europe to stand up. They are standing up. We should be celebrating that instead of criticizing it. So, I do think that this is it is one of those in my category of tactical win even though it's big strategically, but in terms of, know, yep, we wanted Europe to be spending more money and really putting skin to the game and what Germany is doing and what the EU is doing. And we'll see tomorrow that after this, you know, this will be behind our recording, but we're probably going to see a lot more money. but, as you said, Rory, at what cost? At what cost to relationships?

And I think that these costs are just these fundamental shifts of the lack of trust means that we are redrawing our alliance system. We are reoriented. We're rewiring it. And it's not just going to be about Europe because everybody is watching.

Rory Medcalf

Let's go to the Indo-Pacific for a moment because I'm having this conversation with you from Australia at a time where, for a start, we have an election looming in this country. Secondly, national security and geopolitical issues are moving onto the agenda of that election at a time when I think that probably would not have been the government's preference. But we have, among other things, a...a task group of Chinese Navy vessels, Chinese naval vessels that have effectively done a lap of Australia, almost a circumnavigation that's raised a lot of anxiety here. We're looking at the way the Trump administration is treating Europe and treating allies and new questions are emerging about the alliance. And we're probably not paying enough attention to how our friends in the region, the Japanese in particular, are responding. So it would be really useful if you could expand on how you see the new trust gap between the United States and Europe extending into the alliance relationships in the Indo-Pacific where China is rising, where North Korea remains a major security problem.

Beth Sanner

Yeah, this is so important and all eyes of the administration have really been focused on the Middle East and on Europe. And so again, we don't have a lot of people like, you know, the deputy secretary or the undersecretary of defence for policy, the nominee, Bridge Colby is not in yet.

And so we don't have some of the main players in place. And I would say, you know, we actually, I do not know what our policy toward China is. And by extension, I don't know what our policy is really toward the Indo-Pacific. Now, you know, I've heard senior people who are a little bit lower down in the food chain in the Trump administration say that there'll be more continuity in the Asia-Pacific alliance structure then change. And there's some very good signs there.

The very good meeting that was had with the Indian Prime Minister, the Quad meeting, the Quad Foreign Ministers meeting, the Ishiba, Prime Minister Ishiba's meeting went very well. Very genuine warmth from President Trump on that and Prime Minister Ishiba's playing things kind of – he's being very careful. And yet, to add to that, we just had a US carrier visit South Korea. So that's huge. That went on. No, President Trump did not stop that. And we've had some major exercises go on as well.

So, so far, it is quite a bit of continuity. But at the same time, we have some you know, challenging language, I would say, as well as actions that are in the economic realm. And that's going to cause big problems, right? And Rory, you and I have talked about this in the past. There's government to government relations, but there's also how does the public think? And that has an effect in democracies.

And I was just looking at a poll coming out of Australia, I think just came out yesterday, where it said half of Australians, 48 % or something, said that they didn't trust that the United States would come to their rescue, if I'm getting that correct. So I think that is this trust deficit and the fear watching the United States with Ukraine watching the United States with Europe. Everybody is very, very jittery, I think, about, oh gosh, what is going to happen next? In a few days, by the time this comes out, I think, we'll know whether 25 % tariffs go on steel and aluminium from Australia, whether maybe agricultural tariffs are coming.

Japan, South Korea and Australia are in the same boat here. All of them are very, very concerned about the impact of their economy of these tariffs and President Trump has said no exceptions.

So that's not a warm and fuzzy. And honestly, it's not good for the American economy. Our steel industry is not able to fill these gaps. We don't produce all the things that our allies produce that are on this list. And so I don't know whether it will go through. I suspect it will be modified. Today, President Trump said that the auto industry was going to be exempted from the Mexican-Canadian and the Mexico-Canadian tariffs because of the implications for that industry. Well, it's going to be the same. How can we build ships without importing steel? Not possible. So there will be reality that hits these things and suggests to me that yes, there will be shock and awe, but there will be adjustments because U.S. interests will be affected either directly or indirectly because of our close relationship with Australia on, for example, critical minerals. I mean, we do so much together in the United States as well as in Australia on critical minerals, as well as, of course, AUKUS.

Rory Medcalf

And it's interesting to look at what would be the most sensible advice to give to government in Australia, again, at a time where there's politics in this because we have an election campaign, which will be probably underway by the time this podcast is released. We're dealing with security, geopolitical, resilience, preparedness issues on many fronts. Government is understandably focused on economy and cost of living, but we can no longer...quarantine that issue from the national security debate and the alliance. And I think one of the challenges that Australia will face is do we go to some of these really key issues in the alliance, like the access and basing and intelligence arrangements, like the, as you said, the question of critical minerals, which is obviously a great strength or potential strength. Do we go to these issues, again, the contribution we make to the AUKUS submarine program and the American shipbuilding industrial base? Does Australia pre-emptively seek to sort of offer up concessions or commitments or contributions, or do we ourselves play a kind of transactional game or a long-term trust-building game? I think that's the kind of debate that I hope is going on within the Australian ecosystem, I wonder how that would be perceived by this administration.

Beth Sanner

I would say that just my observations have been that no threats should ever be made publicly, even if it's politically expedient, because it doesn't go well. I don't think that's news to Australian leaders. They're pretty...

Rory Medcalf

…threats from an ally to the United States sure what about the pre-emptive offerings sort of contributions tribute.

Beth Sanner

Yeah. Yes, well, these actually do work in some circumstances, but I think that one of the things that concerns people is that, is it ever enough? Do you give and then there's another round of expectations? Or is it one and done and that is enough to solidify? And that's too early to tell. But I think that that is the concern of people, of allies, is it is unclear how to navigate.

I do…can look at Japan and very clearly see that just yesterday when President Trump was speaking in front of the joint session of Congress, he noted Japan's soft bank investment, large investment and Honda investment, and the Honda decision to put a plant in Indiana instead of Mexico for its next factory.

And it's not even immediate thing, but those things add up on the, you know, my pressure is working. And so, you know, it's good to be on the list. And, you know, most of the Australian things that are going on have been in existence for a long time because Australia formed this partnership with the United States, of course, many, many years ago. But I'm saying in terms of some of these newer investments, really happened in the first Trump administration. They're not new, but they're substantial.

Rory Medcalf

Yeah, I think there's been a continuity throughout the Biden administration as well, but I guess it depends how cleverly our leaders and diplomats can package it.

Beth Sanner

Exactly. And a lot of this is packaging because a lot of this is about showing that countries are good partners.

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Rory Medcalf

Can I take you to the broader threat environment though, because I've mentioned that the uncertainties about the United States are not the only challenge that we're facing in this part of the world. I think by the time this is released, not only will we have an election campaign underway, we will have had a major cyclone hit one of our large cities, Brisbane, on the East Coast. It's on its way, quite frightening potential consequences. We've got this anxiety about the Chinese Navy. We've got threats to social cohesion domestically, particularly with the unfolding repercussions of the Middle East conflict. And then of course we're watching with great concern the situation in Europe. If you just take...what's happening in the United States out of the picture for a moment and say look at the threat environment in the world, whether it's the threat environment you analysed a year ago or two years ago or five years ago or today, how is that changing and how much of that is a constant?

Beth Sanner

Well, I think that President Trump's idea is in ending wars is to stabilise the uncertain environment globally. And, you know, I don't have any problem with that. I think that, you know, of course everybody is for ending wars and stabilizing the strains, these big strains in our global system.

it would be great if we could get to some point in the Middle East where people were not so polarized over this because we actually had a path that was an acceptable solution. But I think for me, my big concern is that that is not going to happen. And I do think that, for example, with China, of course, there's this great hope that there will be some kind of grand bargain with China, but I think that the chances of that are very, very low. Because I do not think that China can deliver or that we can offer anything that is going to get close to that kind of grand bargain. I think we will have trouble coming up with even a modus vivendi on trade. We might stabilize things for a little while, but it is not going to miraculously disappear in terms of the tensions. And so I would say that, you know, my guess is that things actually do not substantially improve in the international system. I'm sorry to be skunk at the garden party, but, you know, this is very important for people to be prepared for. You know, one of the quotes I like to use in when I give talks is a quote from Peter Drucker that says, It's not the turbulence that gets you. It's dealing with the turbulence with yesterday's logic. That is the thing that will catch people. And so our ability to shift our mental maps to accept the world that we're in is the thing that we need to do. We cannot cling to the hope that things are going to be going back to, quote, normal. that things are going to necessarily get better in the definition for our, you from your perspective as an Australian, that is not likely. It is going to be seat belts fastened for probably four years and maybe longer.

Rory Medcalf

And from an Australian perspective, I think many of us are watching this and saying, well, the threat environment was bad enough. The risk environment was bad enough as we entered this year because the long impact of China's power play in our region, the fact that the North Korea issue is now based on a greater level of North Korean capability and a very disturbing relationship between North Korea and Russia, by the way, as well.

Beth Sanner

Exactly.

Rory Medcalf

The fact that social cohesion risks, disruptive technology risks, climate risks, all these were accumulating. There may be an intent within the administration in the United States to be a stabilizing force in the world. But of course, what we're seeing is looking very much like instability or a destabilizing force for the moment coming out of the United States. How do people in the administration reconcile that?

Beth Sanner

I first want to agree with you that one of the things that I've been thinking about is that the world has counted on us and Americans have benefited from America being an anchor of stability in the world. And the direction, we don't know yet where exactly we're going to be going, but the direction so far suggests that we may be a net exporter of instability. Right? That's my big fear. So I'm with you on that. think that that's the big thing. But when you look at the world through an America first construct, an anti-institutional construct, know, institutions are either not important or they're bad if they take away power from great leaders. And we're in a world where, as Marco Rubio recently said, that this is a multilateral world, multipolar world, but really through that idea that there are fewer and fewer poles. And I don't know who they imagine those other poles to be.

Is it just America, Russia and China? Because Russia is, you know, it's a tenth of the GDP of the European Union and going down in every measure, demography, their economy, you know, all of these things, right? So, and they're a dictatorship, by the way. And an aggressor. I don't really understand, again, I don't know what the strategy is and what those words mean, but they're definitely, yeah, this is why you and I are concerned.

Rory Medcalf

Does the idea of a, some would call it a reverse Nixon, the idea that somehow by effectively aligning farm war with Russia's great power objectives over Ukraine, that somehow Donald Trump's second administration will prize Russia away from its partnership with China and raise the ability to effectively limit China's power, strike a new deal with China in the Indo-Pacific. Does that hold any water with you?

 

Beth Sanner

No, think it's a, I do think it's a goal. I think that one of the reasons that President Trump wants to normalize relations with Russia is to end the war, but because he thinks that he could then work with Putin toward these greater goals, normalizing, know, stabilizing the relationship somehow with splitting them from China – and if not splitting them from China, doing some trilateral things, right? He suggested that we could do a trilateral nuclear deal, that we could actually do massive disarmament and a decrease of our nuclear arsenals. Wow. You know, that is Reagan-esque and would be fantastic. But I think the chances of that happening are really, really low because what we are doing now in terms of our actions, these are being amplified by Russia and China together, along with Iran and North Korea and others, not necessarily in a coordinated way. But this goes into their game plan of dividing and weakening the West, encouraging our polarization. Every time, you you looked at, if anybody...listened to any part or watched any part of the president's speech before the joint congress yesterday, one thing that you just took away is that, my gosh, know, polarization, how could it get any worse? It's getting worse and worse. And every moment of that is of benefit to our adversaries and they are playing it up.

Rory Medcalf

And you mean polarisation within the United States as well as within the West?

Beth Sanner

Exactly. And I would say that, you know, this is the lesson that I certainly would not deign to speak down to, you know, any other country, but goodness, do you really want to look like us?

Rory Medcalf

The challenge for middle powers in this, for the smaller and middle power countries that are allies or partners with the United States, that liberal democracies that want to preserve a global order based on sovereignty, that still see benefits in openness in the international system. And I'm putting not only Australia, but Canada very much in that basket and so many other friends around the world.

My sense in these countries is that we are all now beginning to double down on our push for greater national resilience. So again, if you're looking for, I guess, a silver lining to some of this chaos that we're seeing, it's that debates about national security and national preparedness in middle powers are accelerating, unfortunately coupled with anxiety about the relationships with the United States. So that's...a notable development. Is that, think, to be perceived in the American strategic community? Will there be voices in Washington that support that approach by middle powers? Is that an advantage in the long run?

Beth Sanner

Yes. Well, I think that in, especially in the Indo-Pacific, there has been a lot of activity by Australia and Japan in particular, but also sometimes with South Korea and India to be collaborating even without the United States. And I have seen that it was encouraged by the Biden administration, which was a change in policy, right?

We're okay as Americans to see you all getting together and doing things and we don't have to be there. I think if it is packaged right in that in terms of this is us taking care of what is our responsibility and doing that in a way that is trying to take the burden off of America's shoulders then I think that that is something that should be welcomed, but it has to be spoken about in the right way, of course. And I think it's important. And to me, it is an anecdote. I think that, as I said, when I was in Australia last year, I think that Australians underestimate their ability to be powerful. You know, I mean, you all have a lot of strengths. And especially when you combine with other regional powers. Yeah, it's not the same as the United States, but it's not nothing.

Rory Medcalf

As you said at the start of this conversation, there seems to be a lack of strategy. There's no clear articulation of strategy. Do you anticipate that that will come together in some way or alternatively will the tensions that you've talked about deepen and worsen what will bring it to a head.

Beth Sanner

This is an administration where there still is not complete agreement among the different players about what it is that they're trying to achieve. You're seeing quite a bit of dissonance between different factions in this administration. It's not like the first administration where people were absolutely on different ends of the pole, but between Vance, for example, much more isolationist, pro, seems to be trying to support divisions in Europe more.

And you know, Rubio? I don't know. I think that there's so many differences here that we don't know what is going to happen. And I think that time will actually force the administration to be more clear about what they're trying to do. And part of that, Rory, is because only the president decides. The president is really at the centre of decision-making in this administration more than any other administration in kind of our recent memory. And they haven't had a chance to sit down and talk that much. And so because it's early and I think as they have more conversations, there will be more clarity and there will be less dissonance. Now, you know, the direction then will depend on what they all decide and ultimately what he decides is the goal.

And I think also the effort to keep some of that hidden because this is part of his negotiating strategy, that will also work itself out because over time it will just be revealed. So I do think that there will be probably more clarity about the strategy as we go forward.

Rory Medcalf

Second last question. You mentioned at the start, you alluded at the start, that there were some wins for the administration as well as all of the challenges and losses that we're seeing. So if you're looking at a tactical ledger of wins and losses on the strategic defence foreign policy front over these early weeks, what does it look like?

Beth Sanner

Well, you know, one of the president's goals is to get more investment in the United States, right? And I think he said last night that he's gotten promises, pledges of one trillion dollars of investment in the United States, both from American companies like Apple, OpenAI, Oracle, as well as foreign companies, SoftBank, Honda, TSMC, the Saudis have pledged.

So there is a lot, I don't know if it adds up to that, but it is a lot of money. And that is part of trying to boost our economy and bring manufacturing back to America because it's absolutely true that our manufacturing industrial base has atrophied over the years and that we are very vulnerable in supply chains as a result of that. And so I think that that is a very good thing that he is getting people to invest in the United States.

Rory Medcalf

Even with some interesting means, right? So, you know, will produce in country, but if you produce here, it'll be all right.

Beth Sanner

Exactly. And so, you know, it is a very, very different mindset than foreign policy, long standing foreign policy viewpoints are, right? That when you have a huge country like America, there has always been a wing of Americans, a cohort of Americans who have believed in isolationism with this thought that we can survive here, that we have everything that we need here. And I personally am not part of that. You know, I don't think that that's true. But that is certainly, I think that Vice President Vance seems to be part of that theory, and they're pushing it forward. And so when you look at it from their perspective on what's being successful, you know, they're getting these investments.

They're getting the EU to stand up in a huge way for the first time on not just burden sharing, but burden shifting. And this is their goal, actually, is to leave Europe in many ways and not focus on that at all. And then you get Mexico and Panama actually doing things, you know, pushing the Chinese out of Panama. They're making progress there. So...again, the question is...Do the ends justify the means? And do the means actually shift what the ends are?

Rory Medcalf

And is it tactical gains and strategic losses or again too soon to tell?

Beth Sanner

Way too soon to tell, but the direction is tactical wins, strategic losses. But it's not too late to change that.

Rory Medcalf

And it's very early days. The final question, Beth, you've been very generous with your time and your insights. And this last question, I know that you had experience working very closely as intelligence briefer with President Trump in the previous administration. And I know that in previous conversations, you're very respectful of the confidentiality of that relationship. Is there anything you can say in broad terms, though, about the President Trump that we are dealing with now, as opposed to the President Trump that you knew some years ago? Are we dealing with the same President Trump?

Beth Sanner

There are lot of similarities, but I also think that one of the very big changes is his embrace of technology, his understanding of the importance of technology and the role of the so-called tech bros, crypto kings in the whole enterprise. And of course, Elon Musk is case number one of that. And so that shift is certainly something people pay attention to. But I think we are underestimating how fundamental that change is for the future of America and maybe the future of the world.

Rory Medcalf

Beth, thank you very much for joining us and I'm sure this won't be the last time we have a conversation with you at the National Security College about the future of the world. Please keep up your fantastic work at trying to make sense of it all, both for observers in the United States but also here in Australia. Thank you, Beth.

Beth Sanner

Thanks Rory, it was a pleasure.

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